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In 1973, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down the ruling that 
recognized a woman's constitutional right to abortion. The plaintiff in the case 
known as Roe v. Wade was a Texas woman who had become pregnant in 1969, 
allegedly as a result of rape. Although she later admitted to having made that 
part of the story up, she proceeded to sue the state legislature in order to 
obtain an abortion, which at the time was illegal in Texas. Until Roe v. Wade 
reached the Supreme Court, the question of abortion rights had been left ' 
entirely up to the states, and a trend towards liberalization of formerly narrow 
restrictions upon those rights had begun to manifest itself in the late 1960s. 
Despite its reputation as less "activist" than its predecessor, the Burger 
Court-so named after its Chief Justice, Warren Burger-decided by a 7-2 
majority to strike down abortion restrictions as infringing upon a fundamental 
individual right to privacy. That a right is recognized as fundamental by the 
Constitution means that neither federal nor state legislatures may abridge it 
unless they can cite compelling interest in doing so. It is a matter of Supreme 
Court practice that a state's "compelling" reasons for abridging a fundamental 
right are virtually never upheld. 
Thus, abortion rights in the United States are different from abortion legis- 
lation in most European countries, where women's control over their repro- 
ductive destinies is a matter, not of the constitutional rights of individual citi- 
zens, but of parliamentary discretion. Moreover, European women are often 
not at liberty to make up their own minds at all, but remain dependent on the 
goodwill of the medical profession, since abortion may only be obtainable on 
"medical" grounds. That is the case notably in Great Britain. 
Roe v. Wade did not, however, grant women total freedom to terminate a 
pregnancy at any time for any reason. The Court's opinion, written by Justice 
William Blackmun, provides for a trimester structure, according to which 
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government may not interfere with the woman's decision at all during the first 
trimester of pregnancy, and may only do so during the second trimester if it is 
necessary to protect the woman's health. In the third trimester, however, the 
fetus is deemed to be "viable," i.e. able to survive outside the womb. At this 
advanced stage of pregnancy, the state's interest in keeping the fetus alive 
allows it to prohibit abortion, unless the purpose is to save the mother's life. 
The ruling in Roe v. Wade was soon made subject to much criticism-legal 
as well as philosophical and medical, from opponents as well as from support- 
ers. Abortion has become such a central issue that no political candidate, from 
the local to the presidential level, can avoid taking a stand on it and it would 
appear to have been decisive in several elections. An understanding of Ameri- 
can politics is therefore incomplete if it does not take into account the abortion 
question, its impact on women's lives, and such related issues as fetal rights 
and fetal protection policies. 
Abortion rights have a long history in the United States.l Before the nineteenth 
century, common law "inherited" from the English allowed women to termi- 
nate pregnancies before qyi,ckening (i.e. before the first instance of fetal 
movement), and apparently even post-quickening abortions were not liable to 
prosecution. Thus, although early American settlers did wish to extend some 
measure of protection to unborn children, not even in Puritan New England 
did they see abortion as murder. 
The earliest anti-abortion statute dates from 1821, and within a relatively 
short time such statutes were enacted in a majority of states. Contrary to what 
one might think, it was the medical profession, rather than the church, which 
was behind this suddenchange in attitudes, a change which coincided with two 
important social trends. One was that the birthrate among Protestants (the 
group that has consistently taken the greatest advantage of the availability of 
abortion) was declining at a time when nowProtestant immigration was on the 
rise; the other was a change in gender roles as more and more women began 
to work outside the home. It seems obvious that anti-abortion legislation, if not 
uniquely or perhaps even consciously designed for this purpose, would never- 
theless have served to counteract both these trends, helping to increase the 
birthrate and tying women to the hearth. 
The twentieth century brought about new changes in values and ideologies. 
During the two World Wars, women were actively encouraged to join the 
labor force, and once there, they were difficult to drive out. In fact, their 
1 Further details can found in Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes (New 
York: Norton, 1990), ch.3, and in Rosalind P. Petchesky, Abortion and Woman's Choice 
(London : Verso, 1985), chs. 2 - 3. The former represents a fairly neutral legal approach, the 
latter a marxist-feminist sociological one. Here I shall only mention those facts which seem to 
me to be of direct relevance to other points made in my argument. 
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number has continued to expand throughout every decade following World 
War II, especially during the 1960s and 1970s. At the same time, the virtual 
absence of any governmental commitment to child care makes it hard for 
American women to reconcile participation in the work force with high fertil- 
ity. Furthermore, as Laurence H. Tribe explains, economists argued from the 
1920s onwards that population control was the key to prosperity.2 Finally, the 
growing importance of the women's movement which emerged in the late 
nineteenth century, and which called for greater autonomy for women in all 
areas, encouraged increasing numbers of young women to embark on higher 
education and consequently to postpone marriage.3 Apart from the post-war 
"baby boom," which Rosalind P. Petchesky calls an "anomaly," the U S .  fertil- 
ity rate has been consistently decreasing since the beginning of this c e n t ~ r y . ~  
The result has been a social and political climate favorable to the legitimation 
of abortion, over and above the already widely available option of "therapeu- 
tic" abortion (involving medical certification that the mother's life or health 
would be at stake, if the pregnancy were carried to term). Thus, the decision 
in Roe v. Wade may be seen-not as government granting women a new and 
supplementary right-but rather as an official recognition of a right of which 
women had already availed themselves, since "by the late 1960s as many as 
1,200,000 women were undergoing illegal abortions each year."5 
Roe v. Wade almost immediately galvanized a right-wing pro-life movement 
into action. Its leaders, predominantly religious fundamentalists, choose to 
consider the fetus as a person endowed with a soul from the moment of con- 
ception, and therefore condemn abortion as murder. Legally, if the fetus has 
the status of a person in the constitutional sense, it must be afforded the same 
rights to "equal protection under the law" granted to its mother under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. This is highly problematical, however, because 
another Fourteenth Amendment provision, which reads: "No state shall ... 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," 
happens to be the principal instance cited in support of Roe's "right to pri- 
vacy," a right which is nowhere explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. 
Roe does not define the fetus as a person, nor does the pro-choice move- 
ment consider it to be so. The result is a fundamental, unresolvable moral 
chasm between the two opposing points of view. The issue of the fetus' 
"personhood" simply cannot be argued on the basis of legal reason, as it is one 
which belongs squarely in the domain of theology. Thus, as one might expect, 
surveys have shown a clear correlation between regular church attendance 
2 Tribe, Abortion., p. 41. 
3 Cf. Petchesky, Abortion and Woman's Choice, Tables 3-2 & 3-3, pp. 109-110. 
4 Ibid., p. 114, Figure 3-1, p. 104. 
5 Ibid., p. 123; Tribe, Abortion, p. 41. 
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(irrespective of denomination) along with a literal interpretation of the Bible, 
and opposition to unrestricted abortion righk6 
For the past 18 years, the pro-life movement has gone all out in an attempt 
to restrict wome2s right to, and the availability of, abortion as much as pos- 
sible. The ultimate goal is to overturn Roe altogether. There are two basic 
ways of achieving this: one is through legislation, the other is by effecting the 
appointment of sympathetic judges to state and federal courts, and, of course, 
especially to the Supreme Court. Since the pro-life movement is financially 
powerful and influential, it has enjoyed a large measure of governmental sup- 
port, in particular during the years of the Reagan administration, and has met 
with considerable success. 
As far as legislative efforts are concerned, the following deserve mention: On 
the congressional level, the most important piece of anti-abortion legislation is 
the 1977 bill known as the Hyde Amendment (after Republican Representative 
Henry Hyde who sponsored it). This bill disallowed federal Medicaid funding 
of abortions, except in cases where the woman's life or health would be in 
danger. This, in fact, represents a watered-down version of the bill originally 
proposed by Hyde, which would have cut off funding regardless of the cir- 
cumstances. Medicaid is a welfare program designed to provide medical assis- 
tance for the poor, and before 1976, it paid for 33% of all legal abortions.7 
The Hyde Amendment thus places a disproportionate burden on poor, non- 
White women. These women constitute the majority of those eligible for 
Medicaid and are, at the same time, three times more likely to choose abortion 
than White middle- or working-class women. Since they typically have at least 
one live child, they presumably prefer abortion, because they find themselves 
unable to provide adequately for the children they already have.8 By ruling 
out this option, government is therefore in effect aggravating, rather than 
attenuating their situation, making the women and their families even more 
dependent on the welfare system. The Hyde Amendment was later held by the 
Supreme Court to be within the boundaries of the Constitution (case of Harris 
v. McRae, 1980), because it limits abortion access only "indirectly." This 
applies even if abortion is deemed a medical necessity. In the opinion of the 
Court, government is perfectly justified in preferring childbirth to abortion 
and therefore in paying only for the former. It should be kept in mind, how- 
ever, that states are still at liberty to allocate non-federal funds to abortion 
services. 
In 1989, Democratic Representative Barbara Boxer attempted to amend the 
6 Cf. Allen D. Hertzke, Representing God in Washington (Knoxville, Tenn.: University of 
Tennessee Press, 1988), tables 4-9, pp. 122-128. 
7 Tribe, Abortion, p. 151. 
8 Petchesky, Abortion and Woman's Choice, p, 156, table 4-1, p. 152. 
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Hyde Amendment by the introduction of a bill which would provide for Medi- 
caid funding if pregnancy was the result of rape. The bill passed b o h  houses, 
but was ultimately vetoed by President Bush, despite his claim to support the 
legal availability of abortion in such cases. 
Also on the congressional level, some hitherto unsuccessful attempts have 
been made to pass a constitutional amendment relative to the abortion question. 
One was introduced by Republican Senator Jesse Helms in 1981 and proposed 
to grant fetuses the status of persons under the Constitution, thereby officially 
recognizing abortion as murder. This statute was recognized by the Right as 
too politically dangerous and subsequently abandoned. 
The other proposal, known as the Hatch Amendment (after Republican 
Senator Orin Hatch), also dates back to the beginning of the Reagan era, and 
its purpose was to return the decision of whether to allow abortion to either 
Congress or the states. So far, nothing has come of it, as a constitutional 
amendment is extremely difficult to bring about (it requires passage by 213 of 
both houses, as well as ratification by 314 of the states). Nevertheless, it is a 
type of measure which commands a certain amount of popular support, both 
because it does not take a clear stand for or against abortion, but merely pro- 
poses to let the people decide, and because it agrees well with the distrust of 
centralized government which has been characteristic of the last decade in 
American politics. 
Based on the view that democracy is to be understood as majority rule, 
many Americans feel that Supreme Court decisions such as Roe are undemo- 
cratic. This may explain why the abourtion issue is less controversial in many 
European countries: here a change of existing legislation would require only a 
new parliamentary majority. However, as both Laurence H. Tribe and Ronald 
Dworkin point out, American democracy with its tripartite structure is pre- 
cisely not a majoritarian one: rather, its distinctive feature of checks and bal- 
ances is aimed at protecting the "inalienable" rights of the individual citizen 
against the whims of transient majorities.9 On the state level, there has been a 
generalized determination to enact legislation that will restrict abortion as a 
realistic alternative to childbirth to the utmost, just short of unconstitutional- 
ity. Many of these laws eventually end up before the Supreme Court. 
Since 1973, five new Justices have been appointed to the Court, and a sixth 
appointment is currently pending. This means that of the original Roe major- 
ity, only Justice Blackmun remains. He is now in his early eighties and likely 
to retire within the foreseeable future, like the other Roe champion, former 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, who handed in his resignation during the summer 
of 1991. President Bush's nominee, Judge Clarence Thomas, whose confirma- 
tion hearings began in September 1991, publicly declared himself an anti- 
9 Tribe, Abortion, p. 80; Ronald Dworkin, "The Future of Abortion," p. 51, New York 
Review of Books, Sept. 28, 1989, pp. 47-51. 
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abortionist a few years ago.1° 
Of the "newcomers," only one, the 1975 Ford appointee Justice Stevens, is 
clearly in favor of abortion rights. Three Justices were appointed by Reagan, 
for whom a nominee's pro-life stance was a decisive factor. They are Justices 
Scalia, Kennedy and O'Connor, the latter being the only woman ever to serve 
on the Court. O'Connor has long been a key figure, because she has in several 
cases provided the swing vote in abortion-related decisions. She would seem to 
believe in the basic constitutionality of abortion (although she has expressed 
criticism of Roe), but she will support any restriction which is not "unduly 
burdensome" to the woman.ll Judging by the decisions handed down by the 
Court since the beginning of her tenure, her conception of "undue burdens" is 
a very narrow one, indeed. President Bush, also a pro-life supporter at pre- 
sent, despite his being openly in favor of Roe on the occasion of his unsuccess- 
ful bid for the Republican presidential nomination in 1980, appointed Justice 
Souter in the fall of 1990.12 Souter's position is still not entirely clear, but his 
vote in the one abortion case which has come before the Court since his ap- 
pointment indicates that he may be willing to overturn Roe, should the oppor- 
tunity arise. This is a matter of great import, because prior to Souter's replac- 
ing the liberal Justice Brennan, abortion-related cases were almost invariably 
decided by a 5-4 majority, with Justice O'Connor providing the swing vote, as 
already mentioned. Many pro-choice supporters fear that whereas she may not 
have wished to take an openly anti-abortion stance as long as her vote was the 
decisive one, she may have no qualms about it, if she is able to do so in the 
context of a 6-3 (soon possibly 7-2) conservative majority.13 
Since Roe, the Court has been asked to review a number of cases where states 
have restricted or otherwise regulated abortion access. The first was the 1976 
case of Planned Parenthood v. Danforth in which the Court struck down a 
Missouri regulation giving the father of the fetus, or the mother's parents in 
the case of a pregnant minor, the right to veto abortion. The Roe majority was 
still largely intact. 
A subsequent case was that of City of Akron v. Akron Center for Repro- 
ductive Health, dating from 1983. At issue here was an Ohio statute containing 
several different provisions: First, it mandated a 24-hour waiting period after 
the woman had signed an "informed consent" form (which required the 
physician to give information about fetal development). A similar requirement 
was struck down in the case of Thornburg v. American College of Obstetri- 
cians and Gynecologists in 1986. Secondly, it imposed hospitalization on 
10 "Marching to a Different Drummer," Time, July 15, 1991, p. 21. 
11 "The Justice in the Middle," Time, July 9, 1990, p. 27. 
12 "Building a 'Big Tent' Around Abortion" Time, February 5,  1990, p. 18. 
13 "The Justice in the Middle," Time, July 9, 1990, p. 27. 
POLITICS OF ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES 71 
women undergoing second trimester abortions. These provisions were both 
struck down. A third provision requiring parental consent for pregnant 
minors was, however, upheld on the condition that a judicial bypass be provi- 
ded for in the case of "mature" minors, where it would demonstrably be im- 
possible or not in the girl's best interest to inform her parents. 
Apart from the fact that Justice O'Connor dissented from the majority in 
this her first abortion case, Akron is interesting because of its ambivalence. 
While striking down the first two provisions represents a liberal reaffirmation 
of Roe, upholding the third seems to imply the endorsement of a conservative 
sexual morality, according to which teenagers ought not to have sex. I base 
this claim on the debate which followed in the wake of last year's cases con- 
cerning parental involvement in teenage abortions, viz. Hodgson v. Minnesota 
and Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Ohio. Here, statutes requiring 
the consent or at least the notification of one or both biological parents were 
upheld. The statute reviewed in Hodgson even went so far as to require the 
physician, rather than the girl herself, to notify the parents. 
Currently, 33 states have similar statutes on the books, and 15 are actively 
enforcing them.14 There may, however, be various legitimate reasons why a 
minor would not wish to let her parents know of her desire to terminate an 
unwanted pregnancy: she may have no contact with one of her parents; the 
parents may be likely to react abusively; or she may simply be afraid of disap- 
pointing them. Nonetheless, the judicial bypass needed in these cases is some- 
times very difficult to obtain, either because few judges agree to conduct such 
hearings, or because the ones who do tend to refuse bypasses. If the girl is 
privileged enough to be able to travel to a state that has no parental consent 
requirement, she may still be able to obtain a legal abortion. If not, she may 
simply repress the whole thing out of fear and go through with her pregnancy, 
making herself highly likely to drop out of school and become a welfare 
case.15 Alternatively, she may resort to a back-alley abortion, like the 17-year- 
old girl from Indiana who died a much-publicized death from just such a pro- 
cedure.16 Conservatives who claim that statutes of this kind are meant to pro- 
mote communication between family members, and that unmarried teenagers 
should "just say no" to sex, are, in my opinion, either acting in bad faith or 
naively closing their eyes to the realities of life in the late twentieth century. 
After all, it is a fact not only that very few American families conform to the 
traditional, two-parent model, but also that roughly 50% of all teenagers are 
sexually active, with 24% of the girls likely to become pregnant.17 Further- 
14 "Teenage and Pregnant," Glamour, March 1991, p. 239. 
15 "Abortion's Hardest Cases," Time, July 9, 1990, p. 25; Petchesky, Abortion and 
Woman's Choice, pp. 149-15 1. 
16 Cf., "Abortion's Hardest Cases," Time, July 9, 1990, p. 22. 
17 "Teenage and Pregnant," Glamour, March 1991, p. 302; Petchesky, Abortion and 
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more, although it may at first sight seem reasonable to give parents a say in 
matters affecting their children's health, this argument cannot be a valid one as 
long as no state has enacted provisions for parental consent when a teenager 
wishes to carry her pregnancy to term-a condition which is far more dan- 
gerous to a young girl than an early abortion.18 
In the light of both Akron and Thornburg, which declared it unconstitutio- 
nal to oblige physicians to inform the patient about fetal development, possible 
negative side-effects of abortion, and alternatives to the procedure, the deci- 
sion in this year's case of Rust v. Sullivan strikes one as somewhat surprising. 
In May, the Supreme Court upheld a federal regulation, dating from the days 
of Ronald Reagan, which prohibits federally funded health clinics from dis- 
cussing abortion with their clients. Once again, the opinion was handed down 
by a 5-4 majority, this time with rookie Justice Souter as the decisive vote. 
Quite apart from the implications of this type of restriction for First Amend- 
ment rights to free speech, the target once again seems to be the poor, for 
whom adequate counselling win no longer be available, unless clinics choose to 
forgo federal funds. This is hardly feasible, since such a choice would entail 
the reduction of other services needed by the poor. 
The most momentous post-Roe case, however, has been that of Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services from 1989. It concerned a Missouri statute 
which, on the one hand, required doctors to pedorm a range of (often expen- 
sive and possibly dangerous) viability tests on fetuses which they had reason to 
believe were more than 20 weeks old. On the other hand, it prohibited abor- 
tions in any hospital or clinic using state-owned assets. Importantly, the law in 
question also contained a statement to the effect that a fetus was a human being 
from the moment of conception. The Supreme Court decided to uphold this 
law in its entirety. Although it did not accept the Bush administration's invita- 
tion to overturn Roe at the same time, many pro-lifers-including Justice 
Scalia-feel that that is nevertheless the ultimate implication of the Webster 
decision.lg Exploiting this weakening of Roe, state legislatures did not hesitate 
to enact or enforce already existing anti-abortion laws.20 
Because of its weight, Webster deserves to be examined in greater detail. In 
relation to that part of the statute which dealt with viability tests, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist wrote in the majority opinion that in upholding it, the Court was 
abandoning the rigid trimester structure of Roe which only allowed states to 
regulate abortion practices in the second trimester in order to preserve the 
Woman's Choice, p. 246. "Abortion's Hardest Cases," Time, July 9, 1990, p. 24; Petchesky, 
Abortion and Woman's Choice, Table 6-1, p. 212. 
18 "Abortion's Hardest Cases," Time, July 9, 1990, p. 25. 
19 Dworkin, "The Future of Abortion," p. 47. 
20 Cf. Tribe, Abortion, pp. 24-25, 177. 
POLITICS OF ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES 73 
woman's health. Justice O'Connor pointed out at the time, and eminent consti- 
tutional scholar Ronald Dworkin concurs, that Rehnquist's statement is legally 
unjustified, so if Rehnquist nevertheless chose to include it in his opinion "the 
conclusion is irresistible that he had determined in advance somehow to darn- 
age Roe v. Wade without explicitly overruling it."21 If this is the case, Roe's 
trimester structure seemed a good place to start, as it has been an oft-criticized 
aspect of that decision. It implies that because of rapid advances in medical 
technology, the right to abortion may be drastically reduced if the time of fetal 
viability can be advanced significantly. It therefore, in Justice O'Connor's 
words (from her dissenting opinion in Akron), puts Roe "on a collision course 
with itself."22 
The second part of Webster has more immediate consequences, because the 
prohibition on using state-owned assets for abortion purposes should be 
understood very broadly. Thus, it includes private health clinics performing 
privately paid abortions, if for instance the clinic happens to be built on land 
leased from the state. Obviously, if similar laws were to be enforced in a large 
number of states, the possibility of obtaining a legal abortion would become 
quite hypothetical for many women. That this can still seen as only an 
"indirect" restriction on abortion access is amazing. In fact, Ronald Dworkin, 
in an article written just prior to the Webster ruling, refers to the statute as 
"obviously unconstitutional" and compares it to "a state ... declar[ing] war on 
its own people because it is angry that the law is on their side."23 
The third issue that should be addressed in connection with Webster is the 
idea of the fetus as a person. The justification for such a view is essentially not 
a legal matter. If it is accepted as valid in legal terms, however, it strikes at the 
very foundation of Roe. Roe placed the right to abortion in the broader 
framework of a right to privacy, but once a woman's decision to terminate her 
pregnancy is seen as involving another person with conflicting interests (since 
abortion at the current stage of medical technology necessarily entails the 
death of the fetus), that decision can no longer be considered a private one. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court upheld the Missouri declaration that the fetus 
was a person from the moment of conception on the grounds that the provision 
was not designed to restrict abortion access. That may be true in this particular 
instance, but allowing a declaration so fundamentally incompatible with Roe to 
stand seems like an outright attack on the reasoning upon which Roe is based. 
From the beginning, several legal scholars have expressed doubts about the 
validity of the right to privacy laid down in Roe. As a matter of fact, Judge 
21 Dworkin, "The Future of Abortion," p. 47. 
22 As quoted in. Nancy K. Rhoden, "Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe vs. 
Wade," Yale Law Journal, Vol. 95, no. 4, 1986, p. 639. 
23 "The Great Abortion Case," New York Review of Books, June 29, 1989, pp. 53. 
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Robert Bork's refusal to recognize this and other unenumerated rights as part 
of the Constitution was the main reason why he failed in 1987 to be appointed 
to the Supreme Court seat eventually filled by Justice Kennedy. In an article 
from 1979, another scholar, Donald H. Regan, suggests that a possible 
"rewriting" of Roe, which not only does away with the tenuous right to pri- 
vacy, but manages to accommodate the view of the fetus as a person.24 
Regan's article is based on a rather brilliant essay by philosopher Judith 
Jarvis Thomson, who argues that abortion can be seen alternatively as self- 
defense, or as the failure to be a "good Sa~nari tan."~~ She establishes an anal- 
ogy between the involuntarily pregnant woman and a person who during his 
sleep has been hooked up to a famous, but unconscious, violinist who needs his 
body for life support. Now, despite society's interest in keeping this gifted 
artist alive, no one would presumably argue that the other person had no right 
to detach himself. The distinction between whether he was acting in self- 
defense, or simply being a "bad Samaritan," would depend partly on the dan- 
ger to himself, and partly on the length of time he would have had to stay 
attached to the violinist. 
Around this idea, Regan constructs a legal argument based on the fact that 
the United States has never had any laws requiring an individual to come to the 
aid of another person, even if the latter's life is in danger. At most, such a 
principle of "good Samaritanism" (however desirable it may otherwise appear 
from a purely ethical point of view) is legally applicable only if the individual 
whose aid is required has voluntarily entered into a sort of "contract" with the 
other. This may be the case of, for instance, an inn-keeper, if one of his guests 
has an accident on the premises, or of parents, who are expected to provide 
for their children. However, a woman wishing to abort her fetus cannot logi- 
cally be said to have undertaken a voluntary responsibility. Because, if she 
had, she would presumably not be seeking an abortion. 
Thus, Regan argues, prohibiting abortion would place such a woman in a 
state of "involuntary servitude," which is unlawful under the Thirteenth 
Amendment. Moreover, given the extraordinary physical imposition inherent 
in carrying a pregnancy to term, abortion restrictions could also be considered 
counter to the Eighth Amendment, which precludes the infliction of "cruel or 
unusual [i.e. corporal] punishment." 
Despite the fact that Roe is not formulated along these lines, Regan's argument 
shows that it is possible to make a convincing case for abortion as a constitu- 
tionally guaranteed right, even if the fetus is regarded as a person. This is 
24 Donald. H. Regan, "Rewriting Roe vs. Wade," Michigan Law Review," Vol. 77, no. 7, 
1979, pp. 1569-1646. 
25 Judith J. Thomson, "A Defense of Abortion," Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 1, no. 
1, 1971, pp. 47-66. 
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important because, along with the gradual chipping away at Roe, there has in 
recent years emerged a phenomenon known as "fetal rights," which seems to 
trade on the assumption that a fetus is, indeed, a person in its own right, and 
one who is temporarily and innocently confined to another's body, at that. 
As late as 1989, Ronald Dworkin still took for granted that 
Even if the fetus is a human being, it is in a unique situation politically as well as biologi- 
cally for a reason that could properly be thought sufficient to deny it constitutional status. 
The state can take action that affects it, in order to protect or advance its interests, only 
through its mother, and only through means that would necessarily restrict her freedom in 
ways no man or other woman's freedom could constitutionally be limited, by dictating her 
diet and other personal and intimate behavior, for example.26 
Since then, the media have increasingly focused attention on cases where 
women have been prosecuted for what might be termed "prenatal child abuse," 
including in particular the delivery of drugs to the unborn (via the umbilical 
cord). Such charges have been brought in at least 17 states.27 
Many of the cases involve women addicted to drugs or alcohol whose babies 
have suffered sometimes severe damage as a result. While we can certainly all 
deplore estimates to the effect that "each year as many as 375,000 newborns in 
the U.S. could suffer harm from their mother's prenatal abuse of illegal 
drugs," post-festum incarceration of the mother hardly seems to be the 
answer.28 Especially since a New York study showed that 54% of drug treat- 
ment clinics in the City refused to accept pregnant women. The figure rose to 
87%, if the woman was addicted to ~ rack .~g  
But substance abuse is not the only instance where fetal rights have been 
cited: A forced cesarean was performed on a young woman who was seriously 
ill with cancer, resulting in her death and that of her child. Another woman 
who failed to follow her doctor's advice relative to a problematical pregnancy 
was charged with a criminal misdemeanor when she gave birth to a brain- 
damaged baby, who later died.30 In view of that fact that women are now 
dragged into court because their fetuses have been injured or killed in auto- 
mobile accidents, it is not unlikely that we may soon see women indicted for 
having smoked cigarettes or drunk wine with meals while pregnant.31 
"Fetal protection policies" arguably belong in this context as well. These are 
best known from the case of UAW v. Johnson Controls, which came before 
26 "The Great Abortion Case," p. 50; my italics. 
27 "Here Come the Pregnancy Police," Glamour, Aug. 1990, pp. 204. 
28 "Do the Unborn Have Rights?" Time, Special issue, Fall 1990, pp. 22-23. 
29 "Here Come the Pregnancy Police," Glamour, Aug. 1990, p. 265. 
30 Ibid., p. 203; "A New Assault on Feminism," The Nation, March 26, 1990, p. 409. 
31 "Here Come the Pregnancy Police," Glamour, Aug. 1990, pp. 203,266; Tribe, Abortion 
and Woman's Choice, p. 235. 
76 American Studies in Scandinavia, Vol. 23, 1991 
the Supreme Court in the spring term of 1991. The Court unanimously struck 
down the rights of certain industries (in casu, a battery manufacturer, but 
several other companies had instituted similar rules) to bar all fertile women 
from jobs which might expose them to toxic substances. It should be empha- 
sized, however, that four of the nine Justices wrote minority opinions to the 
effect that excluding fertile women from hazardous jobs might be justified in 
certain circumstances. This means that, Justice Marshall being gone, so is the 
majority who felt that such policies could never be con~titutional.~~ 
The official rationale behind the policies was the desire to avoid law suits, 
should any female employee give birth to a less than perfectly healthy infant. 
What made them suspect, however, was first, that the substances in question 
may also be detrimental to male fertility; secondly, that jobs were being with- 
held even from women with no desire to procreate; and, thirdly, that no 
attempts were made to improve the safety of the work environment. 
Feminist observers noted at the time that the consequence of upholding fetal 
protection policies would be to deny women access to a very large number of 
well-paid jobs in traditionally male industries. This should be seen in a social 
context of high unemployment, where the median wage of men has decreased 
by 19% in real terms between 1973 and 1987. Moreover, the percentage of 
young women entering the job market during the next decade is predicted to 
be more than fifty percent higher than that of men. In this light, President 
Bush's pro-life stance as well as his vetoing the Boxer Amendment, no longer 
seem inconsistent with the veto he put on the Family and Medical Leave Act of 
1990 (which would have mandated unpaid maternity leave for employees of 
medium-sized and large companies), or with his refusal to establish national 
standards of child care. 
In any case, the concept of fetal rights not only presupposes that the fetus is 
a person, but also that its interests take precedent over those of its mother. In 
order for this to make sense, the fetus must be seen as fundamentally innocent, 
and the mother as selfish and irresponsible. Hence, as K. Pollitt observes, 
as the "rights" of the fetus grow and respect for the capacities and rights of women declines, 
it becomes harder and harder to explain why drug addiction is a crime if it produces an 
addicted baby, but not if it produces a miscarriage, and why a woman can choose abortion, 
but not vodka. And that is just what the pro-lifers want.33 
If the pro-life movement can succeed in linking abortion to fetal rights in the 
public mind, they will be able to exploit two facts: On the one hand, surveys 
show that most Americans are ambivalent about abortion-they feel it is some- 
how morally wrong, yet do not want to outlaw it. On the other hand, they are 
32 "Members Gratified by Decision on 'Fetal Protection' Law," Congressional Quaterly, 
March 23, 1991, p. 749. 
33 "A New Assault on Feminism," The Nation, March 26, 1990, p. 414; my italics. 
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quite willing to assert a woman's responsibility towards a fetus she has electes 
to keep.34 As the idea of the fetus' personhood is reinforced, the discomfort 
which most people experience at the thought of annihilating a potential human 
life may well come to weigh more heavily in the scales than their belief in 
women's right to control their own bodies. 
Even if abortion should eventually be outlawed anew, it will not disappear as a 
social fact. The estimated number of illegal abortions performed before 1973 
is sufficient proof of that. While pro-lifers claim that they are working to save 
lives, it is likely that they are in reality doing quite the opposite: overturning 
Roe would simply force those women not fortunate enough to be able to 
afford convenient overseas voyages to go back to being butchered by quacks, 
risking permanent infertility or even death. 
One last, but important aspect of the abortion debate concerns its impact on 
American political life as a whole. It is a +ell-known fact that elections in the 
United States are increasingly dominated by single issues, rather than coherent 
ideologies. Abortion is perhaps the most salient single issue of all (although the 
war on drugs and street crime are close contenders at the moment). Quite 
possibly, this poses a real threat to democracy. As Ronald Dworkin puts it, 
"ordinary voters are in a worse, not better, position to express their convic- 
tions and preferences across the range of political issues when politicians are 
forced to treat one issue as the only one that counts"35 
Until 1989, it was primarily pro-life supporters who consistently voted for 
sympathetic candidates, but since Webster, the pro-choice side would seem 
finally to have come out of h i b e r n a t i ~ n . ~ ~  The new involvement means that 
women are now being forced to spend time and energy fighting for something 
which has long been recognized as a fundamental 1ibe1-ty.37 .The consequence 
may be to frustrate the political energy of women who feel forced to vote for 
pro-choice candidates with whose policies they may not otherwise agree. 
Another possibility is, however, that women who see their established rights 
undermined may stimulate a major realignment of American party politics. 
34 Cf., Dworkin, "The Great Abortion Case," p. 49. 
35 "Future of Abortion," p. 51. 
36 Tribe, Abortion, p. 179. 
37 Ibid., p. 194-195. 
